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RES IPSA LOQUITUR -

THE BIG UMBRELLA

David E. Seidelson 387
Res ipsa loquitur, "the thing speaks for itself," is descriptive of a negligence
action in which a plaintiff offers circumstantial rather than direct evidence of a
defendant's negligent conduct. The plaintiff's evidence must indicate that the
defendant had exclusive control of the instrumentality that produced the injury and that the event that occurred was not likely to have occurred absent
negligence. This article examines the critical nature of the judicial function in
determining if the two conditions are met. The author focuses on the substantial policy considerations which are confronted by the court in the application
of res ipsa. Next, the article explores the manner by which courts identify and
resolve these underlying policy considerations. The author concludes by suggesting that courts should explicitly identify those policy considerations underlying the invocation of res ipsa and should attempt to be sensitive to those
policy considerations which are not appropriately applicable to every instance
of circumstantial evidence and thus fall outside of the protective umbrella of
res ipsa.

CRYING "FOUL" ON FOUL LANGUAGE ON THE PICKET
LINE:

THE ANOMALOUS DISPLACEMENT OF NONSTRIKERS'

RIGHT TO SUE

Carol D. Rasnic 457
The hostile environment characteristic of picket line activity often is accompanied by crude and abusive language. Courts increasingly tend to interpret TaftHartley as having preempted any state causes of action in a labor dispute setting, virtually eliminating the possibility of recovery by nonstriking workers of
damages for slander, emotional distress, or violation of a state's "fighting
words" statute. The difficulty of proving such words to be coercive or restraining, and thus violative of Taft-Hartley, often leaves these nonstrikers
without a remedy.

THE CONCEPT OF BRAIN LIFE:

SHIFTING THE ABORTION

STANDARD WITHOUT IMPOSING RELIGIOUS VALUES

Joel R. Cornwell 471
From the time the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade held that
states may not prohibit abortion of nonviable fetuses, the viability standard
has been criticized both by pro-life commentators, who assert that a fetus has
a right to life regardless of whether it can survive outside the womb, and by
pro-choice commentators, who assert that a woman has a right to abortion regardless of the point at which medical technology can sustain a fetus ex utero.
This article maintains that the critical question of when a fetus becomes a

person is unanswerable according to scientific criteria, and that the legal standard for adjudging the beginning of life should therefore parallel the legal
standard commonly employed for adjudging the end of life. The author contends that a fetus should be considered a legal person when its brain activity is
such that the fetus, if it were outside the womb, would be considered a living
person for purposes of the Uniform Determination of Death Act. While recognizing that a "brain life" standard would require an uncomfortable moral compromise for both pro-life and pro-choice consciences, the author concludes that
compromise is a political necessity, and that both factions would gain tangible
benefits if a brain life standard were employed.
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